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ABSTRACT:  It is well-known that public pension plans exhibit substantial cross-subsidies, both 
within cohorts, e.g. from early leavers to those who retire at the “sweet spot” (Costrell and 
Podgursky, 2010), and across cohorts, through unfunded liabilities.  However, the cross-
subsidies within and across cohorts have never been provided in an integrated format. This paper 
provides such a framework, based on the gaps between normal cost rates for individuals 
(building on Costrell and McGee, 2017) and the uniform contribution rates for the cohort.  Since 
the unfunded liabilities and associated cross-subsidies across cohorts derive from overly 
optimistic actuarial assumptions, we focus on the historically most important such assumption, 
the rate of return.  We present two main findings.  First, an overly optimistic assumed return 
understates the degree of redistribution within the cohort.   Second (building on Costrell, 2016b), 
persisting with an overly optimistic assumed return leads to steady-state contribution rates that 
exceed the true normal cost (let alone the low-balled rate), i.e. cross-subsidies from the current 
cohort to past cohorts.   Using the case of California, we show how that negative cross-subsidy 
can easily swamp all positive cross-subsidies within the cohort, as contributions exceed the value 
of benefits received by even the most favored individuals – those who retire at the “sweet spot.”   
 
KEYWORDS:   teacher pensions 
 
JEL CODE: I22, H75 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:  The authors thank Andrew Biggs for comments on AEFP conference 
version of Costrell and McGee (2017), which helped lead to this paper.  We also thank CalSTRS 
for making available the fine-grained data used here.  Costrell gratefully acknowledges research 
support from the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.  McGee did not write this report in his 
official capacity at the Laura and John Arnold Foundation.  The views expressed here are those 
of the authors and should not be attributed to their institutions, data providers, or funders.  Any 
and all errors are attributable to the authors. 
 
1 
 
CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION OF TEACHER PENSION COSTS:   
THE IMPACT OF ASSUMED MARKET RETURNS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
The funding plans for traditional teacher pension systems are built upon a highly uneven 
set of benefits, varying widely in value by age of entry and exit.  As we have shown elsewhere 
(Costrell and McGee, 2017), this variation can be informatively represented by the individual 
normal cost rates to fund these benefits.  For example, early leavers may earn benefits worth 5 
percent of salary per year while the benefits of those who stay until retirement are worth 25 
percent.  The aggregate normal cost rate – say 15 percent – is applied to all, uniformly, 
generating cross-subsidies of 10 percent of pay from the 5-percenters to the 25-percenters.  If the 
funding plan pans out – i.e., the actuarial assumptions are fulfilled – these cross-subsidies, by 
design will sum to zero.  In short, some of the contributions by or for the early leavers help pay 
the benefits of the career teachers. 
However, as has been painfully evident for some time, the actuarial assumptions have 
often been overly optimistic – most notably the assumed return on investment – generating 
unfunded liabilities (Munnell, Aubry, and Cafarelli, 2015; Costrell, 2016a).   Specifically, this 
means that the normal cost rates have been low-balled, failing to cover currently accruing 
liabilities, and pushing the costs to future cohorts.    This has two redistributional effects:  (1) 
overstating the assumed return and understating the normal costs understates the cross-subsidies 
within cohorts, since (as we will show) the assumed return has a greater effect on long-termers 
than short-termers; and (2) low-balling the normal cost rate generates a cross-subsidy between 
cohorts, through the unfunded liability, as we have been observing with greater and greater force 
(Backes, et. al., 2016).   Moreover, as Costrell (2016b) has shown, if the plans persist with overly 
optimistic assumptions, these cross-subsidies to past cohorts will persist in steady state.  That is 
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because the faulty assumptions leave the system underfunded in steady state, so the shortfall in 
investment returns must be offset by contributions that exceed the true normal cost.   Indeed, as 
we will show, with the example of California teachers (CalSTRS), it can easily be the case that 
steady state contributions exceed the value of benefits for even the most favored individuals, 
those who receive the greatest cross-subsidy within their cohort:  all individuals in the current 
cohort may be losers, providing net negative cross-subsidies to past cohorts. 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  First, we will review the math of individual normal 
costs and the associated cross-subsidies within cohorts embedded in the funding plan, which is to 
say, when assumptions are fulfilled.  We illustrate by the case of CalSTRS under recent, overly 
optimistic investment assumptions (as acknowledged by CalSTRS), and then under lower 
assumed returns.  This will allow us to examine the impact on the cross-subsidies within cohorts, 
if the plan were to move from high assumed returns, low-balling normal cost, to lower assumed 
returns, with contributions equal to the “true” normal cost, which is much higher.  Next, we will 
consider the impact of failed investment assumptions, where the plan persists with inflated 
assumed returns.  Initially, this pushes costs onto future cohorts, but as the future arrives, the 
contributions not only rise toward and beyond the true normal cost, they actually stay that high in 
steady state.  We estimate the steady-state contribution rate, including the amortization on 
unfunded liabilities, using the math developed in Costrell (2016b), together with data from 
CalSTRS valuation reports.   This allows us to present an integrated picture of steady-state cross-
subsidies within and between cohorts.   The result can easily be quite striking, with net negative 
cross-subsidies for all members of the current cohort. 
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II. INDIVIDUAL NORMAL COST RATES AND CROSS-SUBSIDIZATION 
Pension plans calculate the normal cost rate at the aggregate level, to fund a cohort’s 
benefits as they accrue.  Embedded within the calculation, however, are individual cost rates, 
based on age of entry and exit (Costrell and McGee (2017), Appendix), but they are not publicly 
reported.  Specifically, consider an individual of type (e,s), where e is the age of entry and s (for 
separation) is the age of exit.  For each type (e,s), we identify an individual normal cost rate, nes, 
as a constant percent of salary over one’s career.  We calculate this rate to generate a stream of 
contributions sufficient to fund the individual’s future benefits.  That is, the PV of contributions 
must equal the PV of benefits. 
Formally, for an individual of type (e,s), we must have nesWes = Bes, where Wes is the PV 
of earnings (so nesWes is the PV of contributions) and Bes is the PV of benefits (both evaluated at 
entry).  It immediately follows that the individual cost rate is the ratio of the PV of benefits to 
that of earnings:  
(1) nes = Bes/Wes.   
This is the rate that, applied to the individual’s annual earnings over her career, would prefund 
her benefits.  It represents the value of her benefits earned annually, as a percent of earnings – an 
individual fringe benefit rate for pensions. 
If we compare individuals with different entry and exit ages, (e,s), we find their cost 
rates, nes, vary widely.  In general, for any given e, nes rises with s, from the point of vesting up 
through a peak value retirement age.  This is a manifestation of the well-known back-loading of 
benefits that favors long-termers under traditional pension formulas based on final average 
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salary, FAS (Costrell and Podgursky, 2009, 2010).  The variation in nes with e, for any given s, is 
less obvious, and can go either way.1   
In general, traditional FAS plans levy a joint (employee plus employer) contribution rate, 
c, that is uniform, independent of the individual’s normal cost.  Thus, we effectively have a 
system of cross-subsidies (nes  c), positive or negative, as the value of individual benefits 
exceeds or falls short of the contributions made by or for her.  The four steps we present, to 
understand the system of cross subsidies when optimistic assumptions are not fulfilled take us 
through the analysis of how the true and assumed investment return affect both nes and c.  First 
we present the array of individual cost rates and the aggregate normal cost under the optimistic 
assumed return rꞌ, call them nꞌes and nꞌ.  These generate an array of cross-subsidies (nꞌes  nꞌ) 
within cohorts, embedded within the optimistic funding plan.  Next we consider a funding plan 
without rose-colored glasses, with a lower assumed return r* – we shall refer to it as the “true” 
return – generating higher normal cost rates for the individuals and the aggregate, call them n*es 
and n*.  This will allow us to assess how the funding plan’s system of within-cohort cross-
subsidies is distorted by the optimistic discount rate, (nꞌes  nꞌ) vs. (n*es  n*).  Third, considering 
n*es as the true cost of individual benefits, we consider the system of cross-subsidies, within and 
between cohorts, while contributions are held at the low-balled aggregate normal cost, (n*es  
nꞌ).  Finally, we consider the steady-state contribution rate cꞌ*, formed under the optimistic 
assumption, rꞌ when the true rate is r*, where cꞌ* includes the amortization payments on the 
steady-state unfunded liabilities.  Thus, the steady-state system of cross-subsidies is (n*es  cꞌ*).   
 
                                                     
1 Later entrants with the same exit age have shorter service, so their pension and its PV, Bes, is lower, but so is that of 
their earnings, Wes.  Thus, the pattern can go either way, over different ranges of s, and different discount rates. 
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III.  CROSS-SUBSIDIES WITHIN COHORTS, EMBEDDED IN THE FUNDING PLAN 
Consider an entering cohort, whose entrants vary by age at entry, e, and projected age of 
exit, s.2  Denote the joint frequency of e and s, among entrants, as pes.  Let us now consider a 
uniform normal cost rate, call it n, applied to all members of the cohort (of varying entry ages) 
throughout their careers (of varying length).  It can readily be shown that the uniform cost rate 
required to fund the cohort’s projected benefits is: 
 (2)   𝑛 = ∑ ∑ 𝑛𝑒𝑠(𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑊𝑒𝑠)𝑠 /(∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑠 ).𝑒𝑒   
This is the ratio of the PV of the cohort’s benefits3 to the PV of the cohort’s earnings: the same 
relationship we saw for the individual normal cost rate holds for the cohort as a whole.  This 
expression also shows, importantly, that n is a weighted average of individual normal cost rates 
nes across ages of entry and exit.  The weights for nes are (pesWes)/(∑e∑spesWes), representing the 
share of type (e,s) in the cohort’s PV of earnings.4   
 The deviations (nes  n) are positive and negative, corresponding to whether the cost of 
funding any individual’s benefit exceeds or falls short of the cohort’s uniform contribution rate, 
n.  They constitute cross-subsidies.  Moreover, by the nature of averages, these cross-subsidies 
must add up to zero, when properly weighted, by shares of the cohort’s PV of earnings: 
 (3)  ∑ ∑ (𝑛𝑒𝑠 − 𝑛)(𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑊𝑒𝑠)/(∑ ∑ 𝑝𝑒𝑠𝑊𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) 𝑒𝑠𝑒 = 0.  
Specifically, this means that the funding plan, by definition, embeds cross-subsidies within 
cohorts only – not between the present cohort and past or future cohorts. 
 
                                                     
2 The results in this section can be shown to apply, not simply to a single entering cohort, but to any cohort, past or 
present, or the full set of such cohorts working their way over time through the workforce, under a given benefit 
formula and set of actuarial assumptions (Costrell and McGee (2017)). 
3 Substituting nes = Bes/Wes into the numerator gives ∑e∑spesBes. 
4 These are not the exact weights used in actuarial practice, but are consistent with the approach (see Costrell and 
McGee (2017), Appendix). 
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Illustration with the CalSTRS Plan 
We illustrate with the California State Teacher Retirement System (CalSTRS) plan.  We 
estimate the individual normal cost rates, nes = Bes/Wes, for all entry and exit ages, e,s = 20, … , 
75.   We base our calculations on the CalSTRS actuarial assumptions (slightly modified, as 
explained below) and benefit formula.  The actuarial assumptions cover wage growth (merit 
salary increases by entry age and years of service, and inflation), discount rate, exit rates for 
retirement (by age and years of service), exit rates prior to retirement (by years of service), and 
mortality rates (for female actives and future retirees).   These assumptions are provided in the 
2015 annual valuation report (CalSTRS, 2016a),5 supplemented with more granular data (annual 
rates vs. selected rates) from CalSTRS.  We also use CalSTRS data on the age distribution of 
entrants.  The benefit formula is delineated in the annual valuation report, as well as the member 
handbook (CalSTRS, 2016b).   This includes the retirement eligibility conditions, age-specific 
multipliers (described below), cost of living adjustments (COLA), employee contribution rate, 
discount rate, and interest rate on refunds. 
Since Bes and Wes are proportional to the entry wage, nes = Bes/Wes is independent of it, so 
we can normalize Bes and Wes per dollar of entry wage.  For Wes we have: 
 (4)  𝑊𝑒𝑠 = ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
(𝑒−𝑎)𝑠
𝑎=𝑒 𝑤𝑎|𝑒 = ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
(𝑒−𝑎) ∏ (1 + 𝑔𝑒,(𝛼−𝑒)
𝑤 )𝑎𝛼=𝑒
𝑠
𝑎=𝑒 , 
where wa|e is the wage at age a, given entry at age e (per dollar of entry wage), which is governed 
by the wage growth series 𝑔𝑒,(𝛼−𝑒)
𝑤  (merit plus inflation) by entry age and service, as given by 
CalSTRS actuarial assumptions, and r is the discount rate (discussed further below).
 Benefits can be in the form of a pension or refund of employee contributions.6  If a 
                                                     
5 CalSTRS has since revised its assumptions, as discussed below.   
6 We leave aside disability and death benefits, which comprise about 5 percent of normal cost, less than 1 point. 
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teacher takes the refund, she forgoes the pension (or possibility of future pension), and receives 
the cumulative value of the employee (but not employer) contributions, with accumulated 
interest at the rate set by CalSTRS.  Teachers who leave before vesting, without the expectation 
of returning and becoming eligible for a pension, would certainly take the refund because it is the 
only benefit to which they are entitled.  Teachers who leave after vesting, but too young to draw 
a pension, may either take the refund or leave the money in the fund to draw a pension in the 
future, upon reaching an eligible age.  Finally, teachers who leave service and are eligible for an 
immediate pension, may still choose the refund, although it is generally not financially prudent to 
do so.  If a teacher takes the refund, Bes is the present value of the cumulative employee 
contributions with interest i as determined by CalSTRS, discounted back to entry, PV(Refundes):  
   (5)  𝑃𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠) = 𝑐
𝑒𝑒[∑ (1 + 𝑖)(𝑠−𝑎)𝑤𝑎|𝑒
𝑠
𝑎=𝑒 ]/(1 + 𝑟)
(𝑠−𝑒), 
where cee is the employee contribution rate, (9.205 percent) and i = 4.5 percent in 2015.7 
If a teacher takes the pension, Bes is the present value of the stream of pension payments, 
weighted by the survival probabilities, discounted to entry, PV(Pensiones).  In general terms, 
  (6) 𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠) = ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
(𝑒−𝑎)𝑏(𝑎|𝑒, 𝑠)𝑓(𝑎|𝑠),
𝑎>𝑠
 
where b(a|e,s) is the pension payment at age a, given entry and exit ages e and s, and f(a|s) is the 
survival rate to age a, conditional on survival to exit age s.  The payments b(a|e,s) begin with a 
starting pension equal to an age-specific multiplier × years of service (s – e) × FAS (average of 
final 3 years, normalized per dollar of entry wage), augmented annually with a 2.0 percent 
simple COLA.  Specifically, we consider the “2% at 62” program for new hires (since 2013), 
with multipliers ranging from 1.16 percent at age 55 to 2.0 percent at age 62 and 2.4 percent at 
                                                     
7 For the 2016 valuation report, interest on member accounts is reduced to 3.00 percent. 
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65, after 5-year vesting.  Vested employees who withdraw before age 55 but do not cash out 
must defer the pension to at least age 55, and we assume they collect then.8  Finally, we assume 
that teachers choose the refund or pension to maximize the present value of their benefits:9 
(7)  𝐵𝑒𝑠 = 𝑀𝑎𝑥[𝑃𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑠), 𝑃𝑉(𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠)]. 
Together with Wes from (4), we have nes = Bes/Wes.   This give us the contribution rate required, 
over one’s career, to fund the benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s. 
CalSTRS’ assumed return (and discount rate) through 2015 was rꞌ = 7.5 percent, and is in 
the process of being reduced.10  To illustrate the impact of a reduction in the assumed return, we 
evaluate nes and the associated cross-subsidies at rꞌ = 7.5 percent and r* = 6.0 percent.  The latter 
is a further cut than CalSTRS has yet undertaken, but is illustrative of the possible true return. 
 
Variation in Normal Cost Rates by Age of Entry and Exit   
We first consider the case under the optimistic assumed return of rꞌ = 7.5 percent.  Figure 
1 depicts the normal cost rates, nꞌes, for selected ages of entry (representative of all ages) and all 
exit ages.  The variation is wide, from 6.9 percent to 21.1 percent (the full range, for entry ages 
not shown, is 6.4 to 24.4 percent11).  The pattern for any given entry age (e.g., age 25) is depicted 
along each curve, as the exit age varies.  Prior to vesting, and for some years beyond, the benefit 
is the refund of employee contributions.  The normal cost rate, therefore, starts at the employee 
contribution of 9.205 percent:  each curve begins at the dashed horizontal line representing that 
rate.  The cost rate then gently declines, falling slowly below the employee contribution rate.  
                                                     
8 CalSTRS assumes they defer to age 60.  Our modification eliminates a discontinuity in the individual normal cost 
rate between age 54 and 55 that arises for lower discount rates. 
9 CalSTRS assigns probabilities of taking the refund which may not maximize PV.  Our modified assumption 
eliminates a precipitous drop in the individual normal cost rate upon vesting, due to suboptimal cash-outs. 
10 The discount rate has been cut to 7.25 percent for the 2016 valuation and 7.00 percent thereafter. 
11 The higher rates are for unusual entry ages, later than 45. 
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That is because the interest credit of 4.5 percent is below the fund’s assumed return, 7.5 percent.  
The contribution rate needed to cover the refund falls as this difference accumulates.   
At a certain point, the pension becomes more attractive than the refund.   For example, a 
25-year-old entrant reaches that point at age 47; at this age the pension would still be deferred 
until eligibility at 55, but exceeds in PV the value of the employee refunds.  Beyond that point, 
the normal cost rate rises as the deferral becomes shorter, and then, beyond age 55, there is no 
deferral, but nꞌes continues to rise as the age-specific multiplier grows.  Each year of delayed 
retirement beyond 55 is a year of forgone pension payments, but prior to age 65, the growth in 
the multiplier outweighs this effect.  After age 65 the multiplier stops growing, and the normal 
cost declines.  This pattern is reflected in Figure 1 along each curve, corresponding to any given 
entry age.  In addition to the variation within entry-age cohorts, Figure 1 also depicts the 
(vertical) variation across entry ages for the same exit age.   
 
Cross-Subsidy Rates and the Degree of Redistribution 
The wide variation among individual cost rates contrasts with the uniform contribution 
rate.  That is the weighted average, nꞌ, as given in (2) for r = rꞌ.  This is the normal cost rate that 
will fund the benefits of each or all cohorts, past and present, represented in the current 
workforce, under the current benefit formula and the optimistic assumed return.  We calculate nꞌ 
to be 13.8 percent of pay, depicted in Figure 1 as the solid horizontal line.12   The deviations of 
individual cost rates from nꞌ represent the cross-subsidy rates, (nꞌes  nꞌ).   Those above the line 
receive cross-subsidies from those below the line.  For example, the extreme points depicted for 
nꞌes, of 6.9 and 21.2 percent, represent cross-subsidies of -6.9 and +7.3 percent of pay.   
                                                     
12 This is about one percentage point below CalSTRS’ 2015 calculation of the normal cost rate for new hires, after 
netting out death and disability benefits. 
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These cross-subsidies are built into the funding plan, under the optimistic assumed return.  
For those individuals below the solid line, the plan is counting on using some or all of the 
employer contributions – plus, for many, part of the employee contributions  along with all of 
the assumed returns to help finance the benefits of those above the line.   As shown in (3), the 
weighted sum of the cross-subsidy rates, is zero.   
Using the joint frequencies of entrants, pes, and their shares of lifetime earnings, 
(pesWes)/(∑e∑spesWes), we can calculate a few summary statistics.  Those who provide the cross-
subsidies (those below the line in Figure 1) comprise 68 percent of entrants and account for 49 
percent of their lifetime earnings, and those who receive the cross-subsidies are the remainder.  
How large are the cross-subsidies?   Taken together, the losers provide cross-subsidies that total 
2.6 percent of their lifetime earnings.  That is the average cross-subsidy rate for those below the 
line in Figure 1, weighted by shares of lifetime earnings.  The winners receive cross-subsidies 
that average +2.5 percent.  One can readily verify the zero-sum result:  0.51 × 2.5%  0.49 × 
2.6% = 0.0%.   Thus, in all, taking absolute values of the cross-subsidies, 2.6 percent of total 
income is redistributed (0.51 × 2.5% + 0.49 × 2.6%), about one-fifth of the total normal cost. 
 
How do the Normal Cost Rates and Cross-Subsidies Vary With the Discount Rate? 
The analysis above was based on rꞌ = 7.5 percent.   CalSTRS has already recognized that 
this was overly optimistic and has started to reduce r.  Here we consider what the funding plan 
would look like if r were further reduced to r* = 6.0 percent, which we take as illustrative of the 
“true” rate of return (it is comparable to recent 10-year rolling averages).  Whether this is too 
high or too low, it will serve to show the direction of the impact of the discount rate.  At this 
11 
 
point we are still considering the impact on the distribution of cross-subsidies embedded in the 
funding plan, which is to say that all the cross-subsidies are within cohorts. 
The individual normal cost rates under r* = 6.0 percent are depicted in Figure 2.  As one 
would expect, all the normal cost rates are increased from those depicted in Figure 1.  Since the 
funding plan is no longer counting on such large investment returns, the contributions must be 
higher to fund the benefits.  This much is well-known.  What is perhaps less widely understood 
is that a drop in the assumed return will increase the degree of redistribution embedded in the 
funding plan.  Stated alternatively, an over-optimistic assumed return not only underfunds the 
plan, but also understates the true degree of redistribution, as we will show. 
Specifically, we are interested in how the impact of r on the normal cost rates nes varies, 
since that will determine the impact on the cross-subsidies and the degree of redistribution.   If 
all nes were to rise by the same amount with a drop in r, then n would rise by approximately the 
same amount;13 the cross-subsidies (nes   n) would remain nearly unchanged, and so would the 
degree of redistribution.  This is not the case.   To understand the impact on redistribution, we 
examine more closely how nes is affected for those who receive the benefits in different forms. 
For those who take refunds of the employee contributions, reducing the plan’s assumed 
return on those contributions toward the (lower) interest credited to the refunds raises the cost 
closer to the employee contribution rate, cee.  This can be seen directly: 
   (8)  𝑛𝑒𝑠
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑
= 𝑐𝑒𝑒[∑ (1 + 𝑖)(𝑠−𝑎)𝑤𝑎|𝑒
𝑠
𝑎=𝑒 ]/[∑ (1 + 𝑟)
(𝑠−𝑎)𝑤𝑎|𝑒
𝑠
𝑎=𝑒 ]. 
More to the point, we can see from inspection of (8) that for given e, the impact of r on nes 
increases with s.   The longer the period of employee contributions, the greater will be the impact 
                                                     
13 There would be some small effect from the change in weights attached to the individual cost rates, induced by the 
change in r. 
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of the assumed return on the accumulated difference between that return and any given interest 
rate.  This can be seen comparing Figure 1 with Figure 2, where the assumed return drops toward 
the interest on the refunds, and the normal cost rate rises toward cee.  
 The next group we consider is those who would take the refund under a high discount 
rate, but switch to the pension under a low discount rate.   For example, as mentioned above, 25-
year-old entrants would take the refund up to age 47 under the high discount rate, but as Figure 2 
shows, they would switch to the deferred pension as early as age 42 under the low discount rate, 
since the deferral is less costly in PV terms.   Thus, for those in this age bracket, 42 – 47, the 
impact of a drop in r is even greater than its effect on the PV of refunds.  That is, the impact 
continues to widen, at an accelerated pace, with longer service. 
 Finally, we consider those who would take the pension under either discount rate.  Their 
normal cost rate is: 
  (9) 𝑛𝑒𝑠
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 = ∑ (1 + 𝑟)(𝑒−𝑎)𝑏(𝑎|𝑒, 𝑠)𝑓(𝑎|𝑠)𝑎>𝑠 / ∑ (1 + 𝑟)
(𝑒−𝑎)𝑠
𝑎=𝑒 𝑤𝑎|𝑒. 
A lower discount raises both the numerator and the denominator, but the impact is greater on the 
numerator since the flows are farther out (after separation, rather than before).  Hence a lower 
discount rate raises the normal cost rate for this group, too, as we would expect.  More 
importantly for our inquiry, the expression also suggests that the impact of the discount rate 
increases with the exit age, s, so long as the normal cost rate itself increases with s, i.e. up to the 
point of maximum normal cost.  For if extending the age of exit raises the numerator 
proportionately more than the denominator (so nes rises with s), then the greater impact of r on 
the numerator than the denominator will result in a greater impact of r on nes as s rises.   
 These results are illustrated in Figure 3, which depicts nes for 25-year-old entrants under 
high and low discount rates.  As argued above, the gap between the two curves widens up to the 
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point of peak normal cost, at exit age 65.  The uniform cost rate, n, is a weighted average of the 
individual rates, so it should rise by an amount that exceeds the (smaller) rise of the individual 
rates on the left side of Figures 1 and 2 and is less than the (larger) rise on the right side.   And so 
it does:  n rises by 6.1 percent (from 13.8 to 19.9 percent), while the individual normal costs rise 
by amounts close to zero for early departures, and up to 9 percent for departures at age 65. 
What does this mean for the cross-subsidies?   The cross-subsidies are the gaps (negative 
or positive) between the individual normal cost rates and the uniform rate.  On the left side, the 
rise in the uniform rate exceeds the rise in individual rates, widening the gap.  Conversely, on the 
right side, the individual rates rise by more than the uniform rate, widening the gap here, too.  
Thus, on both sides, we find an increase in the magnitude (absolute value) of the cross-subsidies 
provided and received.  In other words, a drop in the discount rate increases the amount of 
redistribution, as measured by the cross-subsidies in normal cost rates.   For example, the 
extreme points depicted in Figure 2 now represent cross-subsidies of  -11.4 to +8.3 percent to 
percent, widening the previous range (-6.9 to +7.3), especially among the losers.  On average, the 
losers provide cross-subsidies that widen from -2.6 percent of their income to -5.1 percent, while 
the winners receive cross-subsidies that rise from 2.5 percent of income to 3.1 percent.  The 
winners’ share of lifetime earnings rises with the drop in the discount rate (since they tend to 
serve longer), from 51 percent to 63 percent, so the zero-sum result on cross-subsidies still holds:  
0.63 × 3.1%  0.37 × 5.1% = 0.0%.  Finally, taking the absolute values, we find that our measure 
of redistribution rises from 2.6 percent of total income to 3.8 percent (0.63 × 3.1% + 0.37 × 
5.1%).  This is the first of our two main results in this paper:  funding plans based on over-
optimistic market return assumptions understate the degree of redistribution within cohorts, 
especially the impact on the losers. 
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IV.  CROSS-SUBSIDIES WITHIN AND BETWEEN COHORTS, WHEN THE FUNDING PLAN FAILS  
Thus far, we have considered the distributional impact of lowering the assumed rate of 
return, as the normal costs rise non-uniformly, while the contribution rises uniformly.   The 
cross-subsidies rise, but the redistribution remains within the cohort.   We now consider the case 
where the assumed rate of return, r, is maintained at a high level, rꞌ, while the “true” rate of 
return, r*, is lower.   Thus, the funding plan fails.   Consequently, the cross-subsidies are not 
confined to within cohorts, but arise between cohorts.  We consider two configurations, which 
may be interpreted as the short-run and long-run impact of maintaining r = rꞌ in the face of r* < 
rꞌ.  In the short-run, contributions are maintained at the artificially depressed normal cost rate, rꞌ, 
but in the long-run, as unfunded liabilities accumulate, contributions rise to a steady-state level, 
detailed below. 
 
Short-Run Impact of Over-Optimistic Assumptions on Cross-Subsidies 
Over-optimistic assumptions keep the calculated normal cost low, so in the short-run, 
contributions are low as well – that is arguably the unspoken motivation behind the assumption.   
Thus, the cross-subsidies provided and received by the current cohort are straight-forward, given 
by (n*es  nꞌ), where n*es are the true individual normal costs and the contribution rate is 
artificially depressed at nꞌ.   In Figure 2, these would be represented by the gaps between the 
curves shown and the line for nꞌ from Figure 1 (not shown in Figure 2).   These can be 
decomposed as: 
(10) (n*es  nꞌ) = (n*es  n*) + (n*  nꞌ), 
where the first term is the cross-subsidy within the cohort and the second term is between 
cohorts.   The weighted sum across the cohort of the first term is zero, as we have seen above. 
The second term – uniform across the cohort – is positive, representing the normal costs that are 
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accrued but not yet paid.  This may be thought of as the cross-subsidy to be received by the 
current cohort from future cohorts, in current dollar terms. 
 Naturally, the low-balling of the contribution rate reduces the number of losers, to those 
who would otherwise be the biggest losers.  We estimate that if the true return were 6.0 percent 
when CalSTRS assumed 7.5 percent, the losers would comprise about half the cohort, with only 
14 percent of the present value of earnings.   Their average cross-subsidy would be -10.5 percent 
of pay to the rest of the cohort, offset by receiving a cross-subsidy of (n*  nꞌ) = (19.9% - 13.8%) 
= +6.1 percent of pay from future cohorts, for a net cross-subsidy of -4.4 percent.   Conversely, 
the winners receive cross-subsidies of +1.7 percent from their cohort and +6.1 percent from the 
future, for a total cross-subsidy of +7.8 percent of pay.  One may readily check that the within-
cohort cross subsidies sum to zero (0.14 × -10.5% + 0.86 × 1.7% = 0.0%) while the total cross-
subsidies sum to +6.1% (0.14 × -4.4% + 0.86 × 7.8% = +6.1% = (n*  nꞌ)), the shortfall in 
contributions, to be met by future cohorts. 
 
Steady-State Impact of Over-Optimistic Assumptions on Cross-Subsidies 
Over time, over-optimistic assumptions lead to rising contributions, as unfunded 
liabilities grow and actuarial funding systems attempt to amortize them.  Thus, each cohort, as a 
whole, receives lower and lower cross-subsidies from future cohorts, and, eventually, a reversal 
of the direction of cross-subsidies.  Of course, it is not surprising that if an early cohort 
contributes less than the true normal cost, the shortfall must be made up by future cohorts paying 
more than the normal cost.  That is, what began as current cohorts receiving cross-subsidies from 
future cohorts means that, when the future arrives, the current cohort is cross-subsidizing past 
cohorts.   If that were the end of the story, this would simply be a transitory phenomenon, as 
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current cohorts pay off the unfunded liabilities accrued by prior cohorts.  However, there is more 
to the story than that.  As Costrell (2016b) showed, this pattern of cross-subsidization from 
current to past cohorts persists in steady state:  it does not abate, even asymptotically.    
Formally, with true returns r*, the steady-state contribution rate is: 
(11) c* = n* + (cp  n*)(1 – f*), 
where f* is the steady-state funded ratio (with liabilities evaluated at the true rate r*), and cp is 
the pay-go rate (as a percent of payroll).  Thus, c* > n* if cp > n* and f* < 1.  The first condition 
is, in fact, the rationale for an actuarial pre-funding system, and will hold when r* exceeds the 
payroll growth rate, g.  In addition, the steady-state funded ratio f* < 1 under conventional 
amortization formulas, when the assumed return rꞌ exceeds the true return r*.  Indeed, the steady-
state measured funded ratio, fꞌ*, is less than one, even as it inflates the true ratio f* by 
discounting liabilities at rꞌ when the true rate is r*.  As Costrell (2016b) shows: 
(12)   f* <  fꞌ* = (rꞌ - g)/{(rꞌ - g) + (rꞌ - r*)[((1+ rꞌ)/(1+g))N – 1]} < 1 for rꞌ > r* > g, 
where N is the amortization period.  Consequently, the steady-state contribution rate not only 
exceeds the cohort’s low-balled normal cost nꞌ, it also exceeds the true normal cost n*.   
Using data from the CalSTRS valuation report, together with a bit more of the steady-
state math in Costrell (2016b), we can estimate c*.   First, we estimate cp to fall in the range of 
35 – 40 percent.14  Next, using (12) above, we calculate fꞌ* = 56.8 percent for, rꞌ = 7.5 percent, 
                                                     
14 We estimate cp two ways.  First, we take a direct estimate from CalSTRS’ reported ratio of benefits to payroll, 
42.7 percent, and adjust that ratio downward, because the benefits currently paid reflect the old benefit formula 
rather than the one for new hires.  Using CalSTRS’ normal cost rates for these two benefit formulas (after netting 
out death and disability costs), we find cp = 36.3 percent.  Our second estimate takes CalSTRS’ reported ratio of 
measured liabilities (at rꞌ) Lꞌ to payroll, adjusts that downward in the same way for new vs. old benefits, to 7.33, and 
applies the steady-state math of Costrell (2016b), equation (3), to find cp = nꞌ + (Lꞌ/payroll)(rꞌ-g)/(1+g) = 40.3 
percent.  Thus, we consider the range cp = 35 – 40 percent.  In the future, we plan to estimate cp directly from 
CalSTRS’ actuarial assumptions, in the same way we have estimated the normal cost rates.   
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r* = 6.0 percent, g = 3.75 percent (CalSTRS’ assumption), and an open amortization interval of 
30.  Finally, plugging these estimates, along with nꞌ, into the result from Costrell (2016b),  
(13)    c* = nꞌ + (cp - nꞌ)(1 - fꞌ*)/[1 - ((1+g)/(1+ rꞌ))N], 
we calculate the steady-state contribution rate c* at 28 – 31 percent.15   
Using this result, we can also back out of (11) estimates of the true funded ratio f* at 44 - 
48 percent.  Thus, in steady-state the contributions will be augmented above true normal cost by 
over half of the gap between the pay-go and normal cost rates, (cp  n*)(1 – f*).  This excess 
represents the steady-state cross-subsidy from the current cohort to past cohorts. 
Figure 4 depicts the results.  The individual normal cost rates, based on the “true” return 
of 6.0 percent, are reproduced from Figure 2, and the individual cross-subsidies are the gaps 
between the individual rates and the steady-state contribution rate cꞌ*.  The key result here is that 
all (or virtually all) individuals are losers, with negative cross-subsidies.  The contribution rate 
exceeds the value of benefits even for those whose benefits are the most costly.   
The cross-subsidies can, again, be decomposed within and between cohorts: 
(14) (n*es  c*) = (n*es  n*) + (n*  c*). 
If we take the lower bound estimate, cp = 35 percent, such that c* = 27.8 percent, only 2 percent 
of the cohort (with 2 percent of their earnings) enjoys benefits worth more than the contributions, 
receiving an average cross-subsidy of +0.9 percent.  They receive a +8.8 percent subsidy from 
within the cohort, which is offset by -7.9 percent ((n*  c*) = 19.9 – 27.8 percent) contributed to 
pay benefits of past cohorts.  Conversely, the other 98 percent are losers, providing net cross-
                                                     
15 By comparison, CalSTRS’ 2015 contribution rate, based on rꞌ = 7.5 percent, is 30 – 33 percent, and is projected to 
remain in that range to 2046.  CalSTRS’ 2016 valuation report, projects contributions rising to over 40 percent, 
based on r = 7.0 percent.  Our estimates of the steady-state rate are based on factors that both lower the rate (as 
described in the note above) and raise the rate, by virtue of our lower steady-state funded ratio, persisting with 
assumed return of 7.5 percent while the “true” return r* = 6.0 percent.    
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subsidies of -8.1 percent (-0.2 percent within the cohort and -7.9 percent to past cohorts.  Again, 
the within-cohort cross subsidies sum to zero (0.02 × 8.8% - 0.98 × 0.2% = 0.0%) while the total 
cross-subsidies sum to -7.9%, the excess contributions, to fund past cohorts (0.02 × 0.9% - 0.98 
× 8.1% = -7.9% = (n*  c*)). 
 
V.  CONCLUSION  
It is well-known that public pension plans exhibit substantial cross-subsidies, both within 
cohorts, e.g. from early leavers to those who retire at the “sweet spot” (Costrell and Podgursky, 
2010), and across cohorts, through unfunded liabilities.  However, the cross-subsidies within and 
across cohorts have never been provided in an integrated format. This paper provides such a 
framework, based on the gaps between normal cost rates for individuals (building on Costrell 
and McGee, 2017) and the uniform contribution rates for the cohort.  Since the unfunded 
liabilities and associated cross-subsidies across cohorts derive from overly optimistic actuarial 
assumptions, we focus on the historically most important such assumption, the rate of return.  
We present two main findings.  First, an overly optimistic assumed return understates the degree 
of redistribution within the cohort.   Second (building on Costrell, 2016b), persisting with an 
overly optimistic assumed return leads to steady-state contribution rates that exceed the true 
normal cost (let alone the low-balled rate), i.e. cross-subsidies from the current cohort to past 
cohorts.   Using the case of California, we show how that negative cross-subsidy can easily 
swamp all positive cross-subsidies within the cohort, as contributions exceed the value of 
benefits received by even the most favored individuals – those who retire at the “sweet spot.”   
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The curves depict nes, the annual contribution rate required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve;  variation by age of entry is shown across curves.
Figure 1.  Normal Cost Rate, by Entry Age and Age of Exit, r' = 7.5%
Estimated using 2015 CalSTRS assumptions and benefit formula for new hires, slightly modified
25 30 35 40 45Entry Age:
The curves depict n'es, the annual contribution rate required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve;  variation by age of entry is shown across curves.
employee contribution rate
n', uniform normal cost rate
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The curves depict nes, the annual contribution rate required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve;  variation by age of entry is shown across curves.
Figure 2.  Normal Cost Rate, by Entry Age and Age of Exit, r* = 6.0%
Estimated using 2015 CalSTRS assumptions and benefit formula for new hires, slightly modified
25 30 35 40 45Entry Age:
The curves depict n*es, the annual contribution rate required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve;  variation by age of entry is shown across curves.
employee contribution rate
n*, uniform normal cost rate
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The curves depict nes, the annual contribution rate required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve;  variation by age of entry is shown across curves.
Figure 3.  Normal Cost Rate, Entry Age 25, r* = 6.0% vs. r' = 7.5%
Estimated using 2015 CalSTRS assumptions and benefit formula for new hires, slightly modified
r* = 6.0% r' = 7.5%
The curves depict n*25,s and n'25,s, the annual contribution rates required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age 25 and exiting at age s.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve;  variation by assumed return shown across curves.
employee contribution rate
n', uniform normal cost rate, r' = 7.5%
n*, uniform normal cost rate, r* = 6.0%
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The curves depict nes, the annual contribution rate required to fund benefits of an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s.
Variation in cost by age of exit is shown along each curve;  variation by age of entry is shown across curves.
Figure 4.  Steady-State Cross-Subsidies, r* = 6.0%, r' = 7.5%
Steady-state contribution rate, c*, derived using pay-go estimates cp = 35-40% from CalSTRS data and Costrell (2016b)
25 30 35 40 45Entry Age:
The steady-state cross-subsidy for an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s is the gap between the curve and c* line.
The gap between the curve and n* line is the within-cohort cross-subsidy and the gap between n* and c* is across cohorts.
employee contribution rate
n*, true uniform normal cost rate
The steady-state cros -subsidy for an individual entering at age e and exiting at age s is the gap between the curve and c* line.
The gap between the curve and n* line is the within-cohort cross-subsidy and the gap between n* and c* is across cohorts.
c*, assuming cp  = 35%
c*, assuming cp  = 40%
